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Thesis Summary 
 The purpose of this work was to evaluate potential hazards and failures as part of 
the design and economic analysis for a chemical plant that would produce 150,000 tons of 
ethylene oxide per year[1]. The Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) method of analysis was 
used to accomplish this goal. This method of hazard analysis involves brainstorming 
potential errors in a system by examining each element of each process unit in full detail. 
This project was focused on the reactor unit because the reactor has several important 
parameters that could fail, resulting in safety issues within the system. Input for this 
analysis was received from the other members of the process team: Justin Brown, Alyssa 
Matarazzo, and Kyle Tynan as well as faculty mentors Dr. Thomas Stanford and Dr. 
Vincent Van Brunt. 
 Through this analysis, many areas of concern for plant safety were found such as 
the ratio of hydrocarbon to oxygen causing an explosion hazard in the reactor, and the 
buildup of pressure in the reactor causing equipment failure. Additionally, safety 
precautions have been suggested such as adding a pressure relief system to the reactor, 
implementing controls on process parameters such as temperature and pressure, and 
writing emergency shutdown procedures in the case of system malfunction. These safety 
precautions are important for protecting the employees of the plant and the surrounding 
community. 
Introduction 
 The goal of this report was to complete a detailed Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) 
analysis of the ethylene oxide production plant to complement the design and economic 
analysis of the plant conducted by the design group consisting of: Justin Brown, Samantha 
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Ciricillo, Alyssa Matarazzo, and Kyle Tynan[1]. The ethylene oxide plant was designed 
based on extensive research into industrial practices as well as literature on the chemistry 
and chemical kinetics of the direct oxidation of ethylene using a silver supported alumina 
oxide catalyst[2]. The chemical plant was designed to produce approximately 150,000 tons 
per year of ethylene oxide. The process was modeled using the Aspen HYSYS program 
and the process flow diagram was considered for this analysis.   
Process Description 
 Ethylene oxide can be produced from ethylene in a number of ways; however, the 
most common industrial practice is to form ethylene oxide through the direct oxidation of 
ethylene with pure oxygen[2]. The reactant streams include a mixture of light hydrocarbons 
that is 94% ethylene as well as 99.5% pure oxygen[1]. The product stream will be mostly 
pure ethylene oxide as well as a waste liquid stream and vent gas streams. The by-products 
of this process are mostly water and carbon dioxide[2]. The process flow diagram for the 
process can be found in Appendix A and is taken directly from the Aspen HYSYS model 
simulation.  
Table 1: Component List for Hydrocarbon Reactant Stream 
Component Mole Fraction 
Methane 0.02 
Ethylene 0.94 
Ethane 0.03 
Propylene 0.007 
Propane 0.003 
 
This process begins by separating the mixture of light hydrocarbons that includes 
methane, ethane, ethylene, propane and propene in order to get a high purity of ethylene[1]. 
The mole fractions of each component in the stream can be found in Table 1. This 
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separation involves two distillation columns in series to remove the methane in the first 
column and the ethane, propylene and propane in the second from the material steam. After 
these separations, the stream is mixed with the pure oxygen and a recycle stream. Then, 
this reactant stream is fed into the reactor. In the reactor, three main reactions are occurring, 
which are the reactions considered in the model. The main reaction is the direct oxidation 
of ethylene to ethylene oxide. Additionally, ethylene and ethylene oxide undergo complete 
combustion to form carbon dioxide and water[1]. The reactor is a plug flow reactor with 
silver supported alumina oxide catalyst inside the tubes. This catalyst is proven to enhance 
the direct oxidation reaction.  
After the reactor, the stream goes into an absorber. This separates most of the vent 
gases (carbon dioxide, oxygen and ethylene) from the water and ethylene oxide. The water 
and ethylene oxide mixture then goes through a refining process to remove the water and 
remaining vent gases, so the product is 99.73% pure ethylene oxide. The vent gases are 
treated in an amine absorber to remove carbon dioxide and then recycled to the reactor to 
react any remaining ethylene and oxygen[1]. During the process, it is important to pay 
attention to the lower and upper flammability limits of ethylene to avoid potential explosion 
hazards. At 25 °C and 1 atmosphere, the lower flammability limit for ethylene is 2.79% 
and the upper flammability limit for ethylene is 22.30%. The lower flammability limit for 
ethylene at the reactor temperature (240 °C) and pressure (2100 kPa) is 3.27%, while the 
upper flammability limit for ethylene at these conditions is 49.48%. The calculations for 
this data can be found in Appendix C.   
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Implementation of HAZOP Study 
 HAZOP analysis is a well-accepted and effective tool used extensively in industry. 
It is a formal procedure to identify hazards in a chemical production plant as well as 
determining precautions to prevent these hazards[3]. A HAZOP analysis is a structured and 
systematic evaluation of a planned process in order to assess potential risks in the process. 
The ultimate goal of this work was to determine potential hazards and safety issues in the 
design and implement actions to improve the safety of this process and protect the lives of 
those who work in the plant.  
Description of HAZOP Methodology[3],[4] 
 The basic idea of the HAZOP methodology is to brainstorm in a controlled, 
methodical fashion in order to consider all potential operational failures that can occur in 
a chemical process[3].  The first step was to gather a team of people composed of a cross 
section of experienced professionals from different backgrounds[3]. A HAZOP analysis is 
always done in a group[4]. Because this work was conducted in an academic setting, the 
analysis was mainly done individually with some input from peers and mentors as detailed 
in the section labeled “Time of HAZOP Study and Participants of HAZOP Study Group”. 
This procedure typically starts by looking at an up-to-date process flow diagram, such as 
the one in Appendix A. Other process information such as material and energy balances, 
materials of construction, and equipment specifications were also considered.  
Next, the process was considered as a whole to determine which process unit has 
the highest potential for hazards. It was determined that the plug flow reactor would be the 
best unit to look at since it is a key unit in the process and has many process parameters. 
Once the study node was chosen to be the reactor, the intent of the study node was 
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identified[3]. The intent of the reactor is to facilitate the reaction of ethylene and oxygen to 
produce ethylene oxide using a silver supported alumina catalyst for efficiency.  
 Once the initial steps were finished, process parameters for the reactor were 
determined. These parameters included ethylene flow, oxygen flow, ethylene oxide flow, 
temperature, pressure, reactor volume, etcetera, which were determined during the design 
of the plant. These parameters were used to describe potential failures in the process that 
could cause safety issues. Then, guide words were applied to each process parameter to 
describe specific failures that may occur. These guide words are described in Table 2. Not 
every guide word was applicable to every process parameters, and some combinations did 
not produce potential hazards. This procedure could produce hundreds of combinations, 
but only those that were brainstormed and could produce potential hazards were 
considered. The combinations of guide words and process parameters are described more 
fully in the “Deviation” column of the HAZOP analysis table, which can be found in 
Appendix B. 
Table 2: Guide Words for HAZOP Analysis[3]
 
	 6 
 Once the combinations of guide words and parameters were chosen, possible causes 
were considered. Many different occurrences could be the cause of the same failure, so a 
list of potential causes was created in the analysis table. Additionally, a list of possible 
consequences for each guide word/parameter combination was also added to the analysis 
table. These two columns of the table were considered to form the final column of the 
analysis table, “Actions Required”. The final HAZOP analysis table can be found in 
Appendix B of this report. If this ethylene oxide plant were to be actually conducted based 
on the proposed design, the required actions would need to be finished in a timely manner, 
and all process hazard analyses would need to be updated every 3 years[4]. 
Time of HAZOP Study and Participants of HAZOP Study Group 
 This HAZOP analysis took place during the period of January to April of 2019. The 
analysis was completed concurrently with the design of the process and was continually 
updated as the process design was updated. This analysis was mainly led and completed 
by Samantha Ciricillo, but includes input from design team members Justin Brown, Alyssa 
Matarazzo, Kyle Tynan, and faculty mentors Dr. Thomas Stanford and Dr. Vincent Van 
Brunt. Mostly informal meetings were held throughout the period of HAZOP analysis to 
gain input from the group members and mentors.  
Major Results and Findings 
 The HAZOP analysis identified as the main concern for the plant to be the ratios of 
ethylene and ethylene oxide to oxygen in the reactor. If the lower flammability limit or 
upper flammability limit of ethylene was reached in the reactor, then any spark near the 
system could cause an explosion in the plant. The concentrations of oxygen, ethylene, and 
ethylene oxide as well as their ratios should be monitored by the control system in the plant. 
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Assurance of proper flows within the piping is also an important factor, and flow meters 
should be placed throughout the plant to monitor the streams. Emergency procedures 
should be put into place for shutdown in the event of any issues with these ratios or with 
feed or product stream malfunctions. These procedures will be crucial in protecting the 
lives of the plant personnel.  
Additionally, over-pressurization is a concern in the reactor. Many factors can 
cause pressure to build up in the reactor unit, such as a runaway reaction or lack of product 
flow out of the reactor. For this reason, a pressure relief system in the reactor is crucial. 
The implementation of this system is described in the “Future Work” section of the report. 
A pressure relief system should be implemented in the separation unit as well to protect 
from a potential explosion. A situation like this occurred in 1991 at the Union Carbide 
ethylene oxide plant in Sea Drift, TX where the separation unit over-pressured and caused 
extensive damage[5]. The pressure of the system should be monitored using a controls 
system, and pressure relief measures should be put into place. Additionally, there should 
be an emergency shutdown procedure put into place in case of a buildup of pressure.  
The temperature of the system should also be monitored through a control system 
and controlled through heating or cooling jackets on the vessels, especially the reactor. 
Temperature is important for the kinetics of the reaction and for proper heat of reaction to 
be met. Additionally, temperature is important for pressure regulation in the reactor. Lack 
of temperature control could lead to an uncontrolled reaction, which is especially unsafe 
when dealing with oxygen and hydrocarbons that could lead to explosions in uncontrolled 
ratios. Emergency shutdown procedures are important in the event of temperature increase 
above a maximum or decrease below a minimum, as well as a loss of temperature control.  
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Finally, it is important to do routine checks and maintenance of the piping, reactor, 
flow meters, valves, control system, and any involved units to assure proper function. 
Buildup of material in the reactor or piping could cause issues with the reaction or 
corrosion. Additionally, leaks are possible if the equipment is not checked routinely for 
damage or corrosion. Procedures should be put in place for the occurrence of leaks or the 
necessity of non-routine maintenance to assure the safety of the operators, engineers, and 
other staff in the plant. Preventative maintenance should be performed on equipment every 
6 months to prevent failure of the system or the equipment materials. An updated HAZOP 
analysis is necessary for the equipment anytime an update is made or there is a malfunction 
after which the equipment must be adjusted and restarted. This should be at least at a 
frequency of every 3 years.  
Future Work 
 The design of this plant is completely theoretical; therefore, a plant will not be built 
or run in the future based on this design. For this reason, the “Actions Required” detailed 
in the HAZOP analysis chart (Appendix B) were not implemented in the design. However, 
it is still important to consider how these actions would be implemented. Some of the 
actions would be added to the design far before the plant is running. For example, relief 
sizing is an important aspect for safety. Every unit would need to be considered for a 
different type of relief system, and then that relief system would need to be sized for that 
unit[6]. For example, the reactor would likely need a spring-loaded relief valve because the 
mixture of chemicals is not corrosive by nature and is not acutely toxic[3]. The pressure 
drop between the vessel and the valve should be no more than 3% of the set pressure, so 
no more than 63 kPa[3],[6]. The relief valve could be added to the HYSYS simulation and 
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sized in HYSYS[7]. The mixture should go to a properly-sized flare drum or series of flare 
drums to be combusted in a controlled environment to form CO2 and water, which are not 
hazardous[3]. These relief system considerations would need to be continued for every unit 
in the process.  
 Other pre-planned precautions include many of the controls of the plant. A control 
system should be established in the plant in order to monitor temperature, pressure, flow, 
concentration, and other process parameters that would affect the safety of the plant. This 
system allows for safety procedures to be implemented as well as for the process to be 
monitored, which is helpful for business in the long run. If there are reoccurring issues in 
a process, the engineers can take this control data, investigate the underlying issue, and 
suggest new solutions. Control systems can be linked to alarms and warnings in case plant 
personnel need to evacuate in the event of a leak or overpressure.  
 In addition to these pre-planned safety features in the plant, it is of utmost 
importance that plans be put into place for proper safety operating procedures to be 
followed. These plans need to include standard operating procedures, routine equipment 
checks, routine equipment maintenance plans, and emergency shutdown procedures. 
Having these procedures and teaching them to all plant personnel reduces the chance of a 
catastrophic incidence occurring in the plant. If everybody is aware of possible failures in 
the plant and how to mitigate the effects of those issues, then the plant environment is safer. 
New hires should go through extensive safety training, and each employee should receive 
continued safety training throughout his or her entire time at the plant. If everyone is 
committed to doing their part for the safety of the plant, emergencies can be minimized for 
everyone.  
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Conclusions 
 Through this process, it has become clear that safety is a crucial consideration in 
the design of a chemical plant. A thorough safety review and hazard analysis should be 
performed before any plant is built as well as after the plant is complete and ready for 
startup. So many disasters are possible, and awareness is the first step to preventing these 
disasters from occurring. If all plant personnel are on board with making the plant safer, 
then the probability of a catastrophe can be reduced. However, it is important that 
throughout the design process, design engineers should consider how the plant can fail and 
include design features to minimize those failures. The HAZOP methodology is a great 
tool to bring awareness to these potential failures and consider how to prevent them. 
However, the methodology is only as thorough as the committee performing the analysis, 
so it is important that those personnel are responsible and diligent in their analysis. Overall, 
this HAZOP analysis brings to focus the importance of safety analysis as a part of the 
conceptual design of any chemical process. 
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Appendix A: Process Flow Diagrams and Equipment List 
Equipment List: 
 
Equipment: Equipment: Equipment:
Air Heaters Compressors/Expanders Reflux Drums
AC-100 K-100 RD T-100
AC-101 K-101 RD T-101
AC-102 K-102 RD T-103
Condensors K-103 Reflux Pumps
C T-100 K-104 RP T-100
C T-101 K-105 RP T-101
C T-103 K-106 RP T-103
Heat Exchangers Mixers Towers
E-100 MIX-100 T-100
E-101 MIX-100-A T-101
E-102 MIX-101-A T-102
E-103 Pumps T-103
E-104 P-100 T-100-A
E-105 P-101 T-101-A
E-106 P-102 Vessel
E-106-2 P-100-A V-100-A
E-107 Reactor Valves
E-108 PFR-100 VLV-100
E-100-A Reboilers VLV-101
E-101-A R T-100 VLV-102
E-102-A R T-101 VLV-100-A
E-103-A R T-103
E-104-A R T-101-A
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Ethylene Oxide Process Flowsheet Part 1: 
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Ethylene Oxide Process Flowsheet Part 2:
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Ethylene Oxide Process Flowsheet Part 3: 
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Amine Absorber Flowsheet: 
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Appendix B: Ethylene Oxide Production Plant HAZOP Analysis Worksheet 
 
Item Study Node 
Guide 
Word 
Process 
Parameter Deviations Possible Consequences Potential Causes Actions Required 
1.1 Reactor None Ethylene Flow No ethylene flow 
1. Excess oxygen could 
react with any 
possible fuel sources 
in the reactor causing 
uncontrolled 
combustion 
1. Clog in ethylene 
line 
2. Valve failed 
closed in ethylene 
line 
3. Not enough 
ethylene in storage 
1. Routinely check 
ethylene lines for 
build up or 
corrosion 
2. Routinely check 
the level of 
ethylene storage 
tank 
3. Implement safe 
shutdown of the 
reactor when feed 
streams fail 
1.2 Reactor Higher Ethylene Flow Too much ethylene flow 
1. Could reach the UFL 
and cause an 
explosion 
2. Pressure could build 
up in tank causing an 
explosion 
3. Ethylene could leak 
into plant 
1. Flow rate input 
too high 
2. Valve failed 
opened in ethylene 
line 
1. Add interlocks in 
controls to limit 
flow rate below a 
maximum 
2. Set valves to fail 
closed 
3. Monitor ratio of 
oxygen to ethylene 
to keep from 
reaching UFL 
4. Add a PRV into 
tank 
5. Routinely check 
ethylene lines for 
leaks/have leak 
procedure in place 
6. Implement safe 
shutdown of the 
reactor when feed 
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streams 
malfunction 
1.3 Reactor Lower Ethylene Flow Too little ethylene flow 
1. Could reach the LFL 
and cause an 
explosion 
1. Clog in ethylene 
line 
2. Not enough 
ethylene in storage 
1.   Routinely check 
ethylene lines for 
build up or 
corrosion 
2. Routinely check 
the level of 
ethylene storage 
tank 
3. Monitor ratio of 
oxygen to ethylene 
to keep from 
reaching LFL 
4. Implement safe 
shutdown of the 
reactor when feed 
streams fail 
1.4 Reactor Reverse Ethylene Flow Ethylene flow reverses 
1. Pressure could build 
up in pipes and 
storage tank causing 
an explosion 
1. High pressure in 
reactor could 
cause flow to 
reverse 
1. Add a PRV to the 
tank 
2. Add check valves 
to ethylene line to 
prevent back flow 
3. Implement safe 
shutdown of the 
reactor when feed 
streams 
malfunction 
2.1 Reactor None Oxygen Flow No oxygen flow 
1. Ethylene is extremely 
flammable and could 
combust if it comes 
in contact with a 
spark  
1. Clog in oxygen 
line 
2. Valve failed 
closed in oxygen 
line 
3. Not enough 
oxygen in storage 
1. Routinely check 
ethylene lines for 
build up or 
corrosion 
2. Routinely check 
the level of 
ethylene storage 
tank 
	 19 
3. Implement safe 
shutdown of the 
reactor when feed 
streams fail 
2.2 Reactor Higher Oxygen Flow Too much oxygen flow 
1. Could reach LFL and 
cause explosion 
2. Pressure could build 
up in tank and cause 
explosion 
3. Oxygen could leak 
into plant 
1. Flow rate input 
too high 
2. Valve failed 
opened in oxygen 
line 
1. Add interlocks in 
controls to limit 
flow rate below a 
maximum 
2. Set valves to fail 
closed 
3. Monitor ratio of 
oxygen to ethylene 
to keep from 
reaching LFL 
4. Add a PRV into 
tank 
5. Routinely check 
oxygen lines for 
leaks/have leak 
procedure in place 
6. Implement safe 
shutdown of the 
reactor when feed 
streams 
malfunction 
2.3 Reactor Lower Oxygen Flow Too little oxygen flow 
1. Could reach UFL and 
cause explosion 
1. Clog in oxygen 
line 
2. Not enough 
oxygen in storage 
1.   Routinely check 
oxygen lines for 
build up or 
corrosion 
2. Routinely check 
the level of oxygen 
storage tank 
3. Monitor ratio of 
oxygen to ethylene 
to keep from 
reaching LFL 
	 20 
4. Implement safe 
shutdown of the 
reactor when feed 
streams fail 
2.4 Reactor Reverse Oxygen Flow Oxygen flow reverses 
1. Pressure could build 
up in pipes and 
storage tank causing 
an explosion or leak 
1. High pressure in 
reactor could 
cause flow to 
reverse 
1. Add a PRV to the 
tank 
2. Add check valves 
to ethylene line to 
prevent back flow 
3. Implement safe 
shutdown of the 
reactor when feed 
streams 
malfunction 
3.1 Reactor None Product Flow No product flow 
1. Pressure could build 
up in the reactor and 
could cause 
explosion 
2. Ethylene or ethylene 
oxide could combust 
with oxygen in the 
reactor 
1. Clog in product 
line 
2. Valve failed 
closed in product 
line 
1. Regularly check 
product line for 
build up or 
corrosion 
2. Make sure product 
line valves are fail 
open 
3. Add PRV to the 
reactor 
4. Implement safe 
shutdown of the 
reactor when 
product stream fails 
3.2 Reactor Higher Product Flow Too much product flow 
1. Ethylene oxide could 
leak into plant 
2. Separator pressure 
may increase 
3. Unreacted reactants 
could flow out of the 
reactor too quickly 
and would be in an 
uncontrolled ratio 
1. More reacted than 
anticipated 
2. Product flow rate 
set too high 
3. Valve failed open 
in product line 
4. Pressure in reactor 
too high 
1. Set controls for 
product flow rate to 
limit it to a 
maximum 
2. Routinely check for 
leaks in the product 
line 
3. Add a PRV to 
separator 
4. Add PRV to reactor 
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that could cause an 
explosion 
5. Implement safe 
shutdown of the 
reactor when 
product stream 
malfunctions 
3.3 Reactor Lower Product Flow Too little product flow 
1. Pressure in reactor 
could build up and 
cause explosion 
1. Clog in product 
line 
2. Valve closed 
partially open 
1. Regularly check 
product line for 
build up or 
corrosion 
2. Make sure product 
line valves are fail 
open 
3. Add PRV to reactor 
Implement safe 
shutdown of the 
reactor when 
product stream fails 
3.4 Reactor Reverse Product Flow Product flow reverses 
1. Pressure could build 
up in the reactor and 
could cause 
explosion 
2. EO could backflow 
into ethylene or 
oxygen lines 
1. Pressure in reactor 
could be too low 
causing reverse 
product flow 
1. Monitor reactor 
pressure on DCS 
system and have 
emergency 
procedures in 
place 
2. Add PRV on 
reactor 
3. Add check valves 
to product lines, 
ethylene lines and 
oxygen lines 
4. Implement safe 
shutdown of the 
reactor when 
product stream 
malfunctions 
4.1 Reactor Higher Pressure Pressure too high 1. Reactor material could weaken 
1. Uncontrolled 
reaction occurs 
1. Monitor reactor 
pressure on DCS 
system and have 
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causing leak or 
explosion 
2. Too much of a 
certain flow 
coming into 
reactor 
3. Too little product 
flow out of reactor 
4. Temperature 
increases 
dramatically 
emergency 
shutdown 
procedures in place 
2. Add valve controls 
onto product and 
reactant lines 
3. Monitor reactor 
temperature on 
DCS and have 
emergency 
shutdown 
procedures in place 
4. Add PRV to reactor 
5. Add thermal 
control jacket to 
reactor 
4.2 Reactor Lower Pressure Pressure too low 
1. EO line could back 
flow into the reactor 
2. Uncontrolled 
amounts of oxygen or 
ethylene could go 
into the reactor and 
react without 
supervision 
1. Not enough 
reactant coming 
into the reactor 
2. Too much product 
flow leaving the 
reactor 
3. Temperature 
dramatically 
decreases 
4. Reaction is less 
than anticipated 
5. Monitor reactor 
pressure on DCS 
system and have 
emergency 
shutdown 
procedures in place 
6. Add valve controls 
onto product and 
reactant lines 
7. Monitor reactor 
temperature on 
DCS system and 
have emergency 
shutdown 
procedures in place 
8. Add thermal 
control jacket to 
reactor 
5.1 Reactor Higher Temperature Temperature too high 
1. Reactor could 
overheat 
1. Incoming reactant 
temperature is too 
high 
1. Add thermal 
control jacket to 
reactor 
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2. Materials could 
decompose into 
unknown or 
unwanted chemicals 
3. Reactor pressure 
could increase 
2. Reaction 
thermodynamics 
proceed in an 
uncontrolled 
fashion 
2. Monitor reactor 
temperature on 
DCS system and 
have emergency 
shutdown 
procedures in place 
3. Monitor reactor 
pressure on DCS 
system and have 
emergency 
shutdown 
procedures in place 
5.2 Reactor Lower Temperature Temperature too low 
1. Reaction kinetics 
would be affected 
and the reaction 
would be 
unpredictable 
2. Reactor pressure 
could decrease 
1. Incoming reactant 
temperature is too 
low 
1. Add thermal 
control jacket to 
reactor 
2. Monitor reactor 
temperature on 
DCS system and 
have emergency 
shutdown 
procedures in place 
3. Monitor reactor 
pressure on DCS 
system and have 
emergency 
shutdown 
procedures in place 
6.1 Reactor Less Than Volume Not enough volume in reactor 
1. Reaction kinetics 
would be affected 
and the reaction 
would be 
unpredictable 
2. Reactor pressure 
could increase  
1. Build up of 
material inside the 
reactor would 
cause the available 
volume to 
decrease 
1. Routinely check for 
buildup in the 
reactor and clean 
the reactor. 
2. Monitor reactor 
pressure on DCS 
system and have 
emergency 
shutdown 
procedures in place 
	 24 
7.1 Reactor None Reaction No reaction occurs 
1. Ethylene and oxygen 
could combust 
causing pressure and 
temperature build up 
1. Catalyst fouling 
or deactivation 
2. Ignition 
temperature for 
reaction is not met 
at the reactor 
conditions 
1. Routinely monitor 
catalyst for 
effectiveness 
2. Monitor reactor 
pressure on DCS 
system and have 
emergency 
shutdown 
procedures in place 
3. Monitor reactor 
temperature on 
DCS system and 
have emergency 
shutdown 
procedures in place 
7.2 Reactor Higher Reaction 
Higher 
conversion than 
expected 
1. Too much EO would 
be formed causing 
pressure buildup in 
reactor 
2. EO could also leak 
into the plant 
1. Temperature is too 
high 
2. Kinetics proceed 
uncontrolled 
1. Control 
temperature 
through DCS and 
thermal jacket  
2. Monitor the 
concentration of 
ethylene oxide in 
the product stream 
and have 
emergency 
shutdown 
procedures in place 
7.3 Reactor Lower Reaction 
Lower 
conversion than 
expected 
1. Ethylene and oxygen 
would be in an 
uncontrolled ratio in 
the reactor 
1. Temperature is too 
low 
2. Kinetics proceed 
uncontrolled 
1. Control 
temperature 
through DCS and 
thermal jacket 
2. Monitor the 
concentration of 
ethylene oxide in 
the product stream 
and have 
emergency 
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shutdown 
procedures in place 
7.4 Reactor Faster Reaction Reaction occurs too fast 
1. EO could react with 
incoming oxygen and 
cause combustion 
1. Temperature is too 
high 
2. Kinetics proceed 
uncontrolled 
1. Control 
temperature 
through DCS and 
thermal jacket 
2. Monitor the 
concentration of 
ethylene oxide in 
the product stream 
and have 
emergency 
shutdown 
procedures in place 
7.5 Reactor Slower Reaction Reaction occurs too slow 
1. Ethylene and oxygen 
would be in an 
uncontrolled ratio in 
the reactor 
1. Temperature is too 
low 
2. Kinetics proceed 
uncontrolled 
1. Control 
temperature 
through DCS and 
thermal jacket 
2. Monitor the 
concentration of 
ethylene oxide in 
the product stream 
and have 
emergency 
shutdown 
procedures in place 
7.6 Reactor As Well As Reaction 
Side reactions 
occur along with 
the anticipated 
reactions 
1. Uncontrolled/unantici
pated side reactions 
could cause 
unwanted products 
1. Impurities in the 
reactants could 
cause side 
reactions 
1. Purify the reactants 
as much as possible 
through separations 
2. Monitor the 
concentration of 
ethylene oxide in 
the product stream 
and have 
emergency 
shutdown 
procedures in place 
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7.7 Reactor Other Than Reaction 
Reactions other 
than those 
anticipated occur 
1. Uncontrolled/unantici
pated reactions could 
cause unwanted 
products 
1. Impurities in the 
reactants could 
react 
2. Ethylene could 
completely 
combust 
1. Purify the reactants 
as much as possible 
through separations 
2. Monitor the 
concentration of 
ethylene oxide in 
the product stream 
and have 
emergency 
shutdown 
procedures in place 
8.1 Reactor Higher Ethylene Concentration 
Concentration of 
ethylene is too 
high 
1. This could reach an 
unsafe ratio of fuel to 
oxygen. 
1. Issues in the 
oxygen feed 
system, a 
compressor fails 
for example 
1. Implement safe 
shutdown of the 
reactor when feed 
streams fail 
2. Routine checking 
of feed stream 
operability 
8.2 Reactor Lower Ethylene Concentration 
Concentration of 
ethylene is too 
low 
1. This could reach an 
unsafe ratio of fuel to 
oxygen. 
1. Impurities in 
stream could 
cause the 
concentration to 
be too low 
1. Purify the reactants 
as much as possible 
through separations 
2. Implement safe 
shutdown of the 
reactor when feed 
streams fail 
9.1 Reactor Higher Oxygen Concentration 
Concentration of 
oxygen is too 
high 
1. This could reach an 
unsafe ratio of fuel to 
oxygen. 
1. Issues in the 
ethylene feed 
system, a 
compressor fails 
for example 
1. Implement safe 
shutdown of the 
reactor when feed 
streams fail 
2. Routine checking 
of feed stream 
operability 
9.1 Reactor Lower Oxygen Concentration 
Concentration of 
oxygen is too 
low 
1. This could reach an 
unsafe ratio of fuel to 
oxygen. 
1. Impurities in 
stream could 
cause the 
concentration to 
be too low 
1. Purify the reactants 
as much as possible 
through separations 
2. Implement safe 
shutdown of the 
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reactor when feed 
streams fail 
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Appendix C: Detailed Calculations 
Lower and Upper Flammability Limits of Ethylene at Reactor Temperature and Pressure: 
Ethylene is an unsaturated alkene, therefore the parameters to calculate the UFL and LFL 
are as follows[8]: ! = 0.4265 ) = 3.41 
Then the Cst value needs to be calculated[3]: ,-./ + 31- → 2,1- + 2.-1 ,34 = 1001 + (678	1-	:7;	<76)=>?7@0.21 ) = 1001 + ( 30.21) = 6.54 
Therefore, at T = 25°C and P = 2100 kPa[8]: BCB = !	 ×	,34 = 0.4265	 × 	6.54 = 2.79% HCB = )	 ×	,34 = 3.41	 × 	6.54 = 22.30% 
To find these values at the reactor temp of 240°C, the heat of combustion is needed[9]: 
∆.J = −1411.20	 LM678 = −337.29 L<!8678  
Therefore, at T = 240°C[3]: 
BCB = BCB-N − 0.75∆.J (O − 25) = 2.79 − 0.75−337.29 (240 − 25) = 3.27% HCB = HCB-N + 0.75∆.J (O − 25) = 22.30 + 0.75−337.29 (240 − 25) = 21.82% 
The LFL does not change much with high pressure, but to find the UFL at the reactor 
pressure of P = 2100 kPa gauge = 2.201 MPa abs[3]: HCB = HCBQ	R4S + 20.6(log(W) + 1) = 21.82 + 20.6(log(2.201) + 1) = 49.48% 
Therefore, at reactor temperature and pressure: 
	 29 
BCB = 3.27% HCB = 49.48% 
 
